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Summary. Measures of unemployment and poverty have tended to focus solely on
those currently unemployed or below the poverty line. This approach has ignored
the members of society that are vulnerable to becoming unemployed or falling into
poverty. Current literature in this area has implicitly assumed that since someone
who is vulnerable experiences pain from the chance of becoming unemployed or
falling into poverty, our standard measures of unemployment and poverty do not
accurately account for this pain. The implication is that vulnerability is a ‘bad’ and
policies should aim to reduce the number of people who are vulnerable in a society.
In this paper we argue that, at the macro level, vulnerability can be viewed as a
‘good’ because, with unemployment remaining constant, the presence of vulnerable
people implies that there must also exist currently unemployed people who expect to
find work in the near future. And a society where unemployment is more equitably
shared is better than a society where the burden of unemployment is carried by only
a few. Given this view of vulnerability we then suggest a class of measures that, un-
like the standard unemployment rate, account for the amount of vulnerability that
exists in a society. We show some attractive axioms that our measure satisfies, fully
characterize our measure and apply it to data from the U.S. and South Africa.
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1 Introduction
Traditional measures of unemployment or poverty were only concerned
with the total number of people unemployed or living in poverty. In recent
years such measures have come under criticism for ignoring those who may not
currently be poor or unemployed but are vulnerable, that is, they live under
the risk of becoming unemployed or poor (see [14, 10, 28]). And alongside
this criticism a small but rapidly growing literature is emerging that looks at
various aspects of vulnerability and tries to measure it [17, 19, 2]. 3
There is a presumption in much of this literature and the policy state-
ments of international organizations and governments that since vulnerability
is bad, we should craft policy to rescue people from being vulnerable. We
argue in this paper that such a prescription is wrong, or, at best, misleading.
Under a variety of ‘normal’ situations, having some people vulnerable to un-
employment or to poverty make the aggregate problem of unemployment or
poverty less severe (and more bearable).
The aim of this paper is to explain this normative stance of ours, to develop
measures of unemployment and poverty that take account of this stance and
then to apply it to U.S. and South African data.
The explanation of our normative position is not complicated and the gen-
eral point can be made simply enough. Let us start by considering the case
of unemployment. Suppose there is a society in which, currently, some people
3 An important precursor of this literature is a body of writing that occurred around
the theme of income mobility: see, for instance [24, 15, 12].
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are unemployed and some people are vulnerable to unemployment (that is,
there is a probability that they will become unemployed in the next period).
The presumption in much of the literature and in many World Bank policy
discussions (see, for instance, [29]) is that the standard measure of unemploy-
ment, which ignores the vulnerable, effectively underestimates the aggregate
pain of unemployment (including the pain of its anticipation) in society. We,
on the other hand, will argue that the standard measure of unemployment
underestimates, not the pain, but the inequity of the pain of unemployment.
Our argument is this – if unemployment holds constant over time and there
are, currently, some people vulnerable to unemployment, then there must be
some currently unemployed people who have a positive probability of becom-
ing employed in the next period. If this is so, then an aggregate (that is, an
economy-wide) measure of effective unemployment, while taking account of
the pain of those who live under the risk of unemployment, must also take ac-
count of the hope of the currently unemployed who expect to find jobs soon.
We will argue presently that in an overall measure of unemployment there
is reason to treat the latter as more than offsetting the former. We should
clarify that, contrary to the impression that the above sentences might create,
we do not take a welfarist approach in this paper but use the above argument
concerning the pain of living under the risk of unemployment as motivation
for creating distribution-sensitive measures of unemployment.
Consider the point some would make, that we are not right to assume that
just because there are some people who are vulnerable to unemployment, there
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must be people currently unemployed but who have a positive probability of
finding jobs in the next period. Our response to this is that if there were
no such people, then having people who are vulnerable to unemployment is
equivalent to saying that unemployment will rise tomorrow. If we then treat
the situation as worse than what the standard measure captures, this does not
show our valuation of vulnerability but the fact that the absolute amount of
unemployment is about to rise. To isolate our attitude towards vulnerability,
we must consider a case where the vulnerable population rises but the total
number unemployed remains unchanged. But this compels us to assume that
a vulnerable population will be matched by a population expecting a converse
shift – out of unemployment.
To close the argument consider two societies, x and y, in which unemploy-
ment is the same, say 10%, and this remains constant over time. However, in
society x no one is vulnerable to unemployment, while in y, 10% are vulnera-
ble, that is they are currently employed but face a risk of unemployment. In
other words, the total amount of the burden of unemployment to be shared
in both societies is the same (10% of the people will have to be unemployed)
but in y this burden is shared by 20% of the population, while in x this is
borne entirely by only 10% of the population. The same way that, ceteris
paribus (to use a term rapidly going into extinction), greater equality in the
distribution of income and wealth (‘good things’, that is) is valued positively
in most societies, we feel that there is reason to prefer a society where the
‘bads’, such as unemployment, are more equally distributed. It follows that,
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starting with society x, if vulnerability is increased and we reach society y,
then we must consider this a change for the better. Therefore, the effective
unemployment must be considered to be less in society y than in x. 4 The
next section formalizes the above idea by suggesting a new measure of effective
unemployment.
The example just given is the idea that will be tracked in this paper.
A full-blown analysis of individual vulnerability (as in [8, 11, 17]) entails
‘dynamics’ – how a person who may be employed today fares tomorrow. But
in this paper we stay away from a full-blown dynamic account of vulnerability.
What we are, instead, interested in is the common ground that lies between
questions of vulnerability and questions of distribution that arise when we
are attempting to create an aggregate measure of effective unemployment.
Hence, the critical question that we are concerned with is the normative issue
of how the “distribution of some fixed amount of unemployment time may
be captured” with an inclination to favor “any trend towards a more equal
distribution of unemployment” [26, p.5]
These concerns are shared in a parallel and large literature on unemploy-
ment durations (see, for instance [9, 1, 25]). However, the effort to bring these
concerns under one aggregate measure of effective unemployment is quite rare
4 Another case for better sharing of ‘unemployment’ can be made by arguing that,
within each household, the unemployed are helped by the employed. In such a
situation there arises the case for a better distribution of employment across
households, as was argued Basu and Foster in [6] in the context of literacy.
6 Basu and Nolen
([26, 18, 7] are the only ones that these authors can think of); and that is
what is attempted in this paper.
2 Effective Unemployment
Consider a society with n persons. Let ri be the fraction of a year during
which person i is unemployed. Hence, by the measure of the “standard un-
employment rate” this society’s unemployment is
U ≡ r1 + r2 + ... + rn
n
(1)
The standard unemployment measure that one encounters in newspapers is
usually the above measure (often multiplied by 100, since the measure is
generally stated in percentage terms).
From the discussion in the previous section it should be evident that we are
looking for a measure of unemployment which is distribution sensitive. That
is, if the same aggregate unemployment is unevenly shared in one society, we
shall consider the effective unemployment to be greater in the more unequal
society. We codify this later, in Axiom E, as the “equity axiom.”
Let us define an unemployment profile of a society to be a vector
(r1, r2, ..., rn) such that, for all i, ri ∈ [0, 1]. Let ∆ be the collection of
all unemployment profiles. Hence, ∆ = {(r1, r2, ..., rn) | n ∈ Z++ and
ri ∈ [0, 1] , ∀i} where Z++ is the set of strictly positive integers.
Formally, a measure of unemployment (hereafter referred to as MOU)
is a mapping
Vulnerability, Unemployment and Poverty 7
M : ∆→ R+
where R+ is the set of non-negative real numbers.
The MOU that we propose in this paper, takes the following form:
Mβ (r1, ..., rn) ≡ 1
β
−
n∏
i=1
(
1
β
− ri) 1n (2)
where β ∈ (0, 1)
Since for every β ∈ (0, 1) we have a distinct measure Mβ , what we have
just proposed is a class of new measures of unemployment. We shall show
that these measures have appealing properties, demonstrate, with some actual
empirical examples, how using these new measures make a difference to the
description of unemployment and then fully characterize these measures. Let
us from now on call an MOU defined by (2), above, an effective unemploy-
ment rate.
One property of every member of the family of effective unemployment
rates worth observing at the outset is that if R = (r1, r2, ..., rn) is such that
ri = r, ∀i, then Mβ (R) = r. In other words, if the burden of unemployment
is perfectly equitably shared by everybody then the effective unemployment
rate is independent of β ∈ (0, 1) and equal to the standard unemployment
rate defined in (1).
It is worth checking what the limits or boundaries of our class of mea-
sures look like. First consider the case where β = 1. This measure (which
is not a part of the class we are recommending) is then represented by:
M1(r1, r2, ..., rn) = 1 −
n∏
i=1
(1− ri)
1
n . Note that if, for some i, ri = 1 (one
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person is fully unemployed) then M1 = 1. Hence, this measure makes no
distinction between the cases where 1 person is fully unemployed and where
10 persons are fully unemployed. It amounts to an extreme evaluation where
a tragedy for one is a tragedy for all. This is the standard ‘multiplicative’
form of an evaluation function.
Now, what about the other limit, that is as β goes to 0? It can be shown
that as β → 0, Mβ → U . That is as β goes to 0, our measure converges to the
standard unemployment rate as defined by (1). The first lemma establishes
this result. Since the standard measure is one in which individuals’ unemploy-
ment are aggregated by simply adding up, this could be thought of as a kind
of utilitarian or additive representation of unemployment. Hence the class
of measures that we are proposing is bounded at one end by a multiplicative
representation and at the other end by an additive one.
Lemma 1. For all R = (r1, r2, ..., rn) ∈ ∆, and for all β ∈ (0, 1),
lim
β→0
Mβ(R) =
∑n
i=1 ri
n
Proof.
lim
β→0
Mβ (R) = lim
β→0
{ 1
β
−
n∏
i=1
(
1
β
− ri) 1n }
= lim
β→0
{ 1
β
[1−
n∏
i=1
(β)
1
n (
1
β
− ri) 1n ]}
= lim
β→0
{ 1
β
[1−
n∏
i=1
(1− βri) 1n ]}
= lim
β→0
{ [1−
∏n
i=1(1− βri)
1
n ]
β
} = 0
0
So we may now use L’Hoˆpital’s Rule. Note that
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∂
∂β
β = 1,
and
∂
∂β
[1−
n∏
i=1
(1− βri) 1n ] = −
n∑
k=1
(
1
n
)
(1− βrk)
1−n
n (−rk) (
∏
i6=k
(1− βri) 1n )
Taking the limit of this numerator we get
lim
β→0
{−
n∑
k=1
(
1
n
)
(1− βrk)
1−n
n (−rk) (
∏
i 6=k
(1− βri) 1n )} = −
n∑
k=1
(
1
n
)
(−rk)
=
1
n
n∑
k=1
rk
Thus by L’Hoˆpital’s Rule
lim
β→0
{ [1−
∏n
i=1(1− βri)
1
n ]
β
} = 1
n
n∑
k=1
rk
Which implies that
lim
β→0
Mβ (R) =
1
n
n∑
k=1
rk
uunionsq
We shall now demonstrate how the effective unemployment rate, as char-
acterized by (2), satisfies some attractive axioms. First of all consider two
routine axioms.
Axiom O (Monotonicity Axiom): An MOU, M, is said to satisfy
the monotonicity axiom if for any R = (r1, r2, ..., rn) ∈ ∆ and R′ =
(r′1, r
′
2, ..., r
′
n) ∈ ∆ such that, ∀i, ri ≥ r′i and ∃ j where rj > r′j , then
M(R) > M(R′).
10 Basu and Nolen
Axiom P (Population Replication Axiom): An MOU, M, is said to
satisfy the population replication axiom if for any R = (r1, r2, ..., rn) ∈ ∆ and
Rk = (r′1, r
′
2, ..., r
′
kn) ∈ ∆, where Rk is a k-replica of R for some positive
integer k (that is r′j = ri, ∀j ∈ {1 + (i− 1) k, ..., ik}, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}), then
M (R) = M
(
Rk
)
.
These two axioms are standard and we would expect a good measure to
satisfy them. Fortunately – as is easy to see – the effective unemployment
rate that we have proposed satisfies both these axioms. Observe that, given
the monotonicity axiom, coupled with the fact that Mβ(1, 1, ..., 1) = 1, we
now know that our measure ranges from 0 to 1. That is, Mβ(∆) ⊂ [0, 1].
Our measure, and the need to break away from the standard unemploy-
ment concept, was motivated by using an equity argument, namely, that it is
superior to have a society where the burden of a certain amount of aggregate
unemployment is more widely shared. So it is important to check that the
effective unemployment rate satisfies equity. The simplest idea of equity may
be formalized as follows.
Axiom E (Equity Axiom): An MOU, M, is said to satisfy the equity
axiom if for R = (r1, r2, ..., rn) ∈ ∆ and R∗ = (r∗, r∗, ..., r∗) ∈ ∆ such that∑n
i=1 ri = nr
∗ and R 6= R∗, then M (R) > M (R∗).
It can be shown that Mβ satisfies the equity axiom for every β ∈ (0, 1).
But instead of showing this directly, we will show that Mβ satisfies another ax-
iom and then show that the latter implies the equity axiom. This other axiom
is the ‘transfer axiom’ widely used in the literature on poverty and inequality
measurement (see [21] for instance). This, in the context of unemployment,
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says the following. Suppose there are two people, one who is unemployed more
than the other. Now if the more unemployed person becomes even more un-
employed – say by ε amount of time – and the less unemployed person finds
more work – again by ε amount of time – then the effective unemployment is
higher. Formally,
Axiom T (Transfer Axiom): An MOU, M, is said to satisfy the transfer
axiom if for any R = (r1, r2, ..., rn) ∈ ∆ and R′ = (r′1, r′2, ..., r′n) ∈ ∆ such
that rk = r′k ∀k 6= i, j, ri ≥ rj and r′i = ri + ε ≤ 1 and r′j = rj − ε ≥ 0 (for
some ε > 0), then M(R′) > M(R).
Lemma 2. For all R = (r1, r2, ..., rn) ∈ ∆, and for all β ∈ (0, 1) every effec-
tive unemployment rate, Mβ, satisfies the transfer axiom.
Proof. Mβ (R′) = 1β −
n∏
k=1
( 1β − r′k)
1
n
= 1β − ( 1β − r′i)
1
n ( 1β − r′j)
1
n
n∏
k 6=i,j
( 1β − r′k)
1
n
= 1β − [( 1β − ri − )( 1β − rj + )]
1
n
n∏
k 6=i,j
( 1β − rk)
1
n
= 1β − [
(
1
β − ri
)(
1
β − rj
)
− (ri − rj)ε− ε2] 1n
n∏
k 6=i,j
( 1β − rk)
1
n
> 1β−[
(
1
β − ri
)(
1
β − rj
)
]
n∏
k 6=i,j
( 1β−rk)
1
n , since ri ≥ rj , ε > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1)
= 1β −
n∏
i=1
( 1β − ri)
1
n = Mβ (R)
uunionsq
The fact that Mβ satisfies the equity axiom follows from Lemma 2 and
the following lemma.
Lemma 3. If an MOU satisfies the transfer axiom, it must satisfy the equity
axiom.
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Proof. Suppose M is an MOU that satisfies the transfer axiom.
Consider, R˜ = (r1, r2, .... , rn) and R∗ = (r∗, r∗, .... , r∗) which satisfy the
hypotheses of the equity axiom. That is R˜, R∗ ∈ ∆, R˜ 6= R∗ and∑n
i=1 ri = nr
∗
Define S ⊂ ∆ such that S ≡ {R = (r1, r2, .... , rn) ∈ ∆ |
∑n
i=1 ri = nr
∗}.
Note that for any R 6= R∗, R = (r1, r2, ... , rn) ∈ S\{R∗}
So we can define r(R) ≡ max
i
ri and r (R) ≡ min
i
ri.
Let ε = min{r(R)− r∗, r∗ − r(R)}
Now define a mapping Ψ : S → S, as follows:
Ψ (R∗) = R∗or, if R = (r1, r2, ...., rn) 6= R∗, then Ψ(R) = R′
where R′ = (r′1, r
′
2, ... , r
′
n) such that r
′
k = rk, ∀rk 6= r(R), r (R) ,
and r′i = r (R) + ε for ri = r (R)
and r′j = r(R)− ε for rj = r(R)
By the transfer axiom we know that M(R) > M(Ψ(R)).
Now look at the infinite sequence {R1, R2, ..... }
such that R1 = R˜ and Rt+1 = Ψ(Rt) ∀t > 1.
There must exist some t such that ∀t ≥ t, Rt = R∗.
Thus M
(
R1
)
> M (Rt) , ∀t > 1, and therefore M (˜R) > M (R∗)
uunionsq
In the light of this result, the next lemma is obvious and stated only for
completeness.
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Lemma 4. Every effective unemployment rate, Mβ, satisfies the Equity Ax-
iom.
While the measure being suggested here has attractive axiomatic proper-
ties, which particular β should one use when applying this measure? One pos-
sibility is to study the sensitivity of ranking societies with respect to changes
in β. The other is to pick some salient values of β from the interval (0, 1) and
use those specific measures. This is the strategy that is often used vis-a-vis
the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke family of poverty measures (see [13]).
For such salient β’s an obvious one is the half-way mark, that is, β = 12 .
There is another one, β = 89 , which appears unnatural at first sight, but has
a natural explanation.
Consider a society of size n and suppose that x is the fraction of society
that has to be unemployed. In other words, the total amount of jobs available
is (1− x)n. For matters of illustration we are ignoring the fact that (1− x)n
may not be an integer. Let us fix x and consider different distributions of
the total amount of unemployment nx, and their corresponding measures of
effective unemployment. By using the equity axiom it is clear that effective
unemployment is minimized if nx is distributed equitably, that is, if each
person is unemployed a fraction x of her time.
Let m(x) be the minimum effective unemployment rate for a society with
a total burden of unemployment nx. It is easy to see this is independent of
β ∈ (0, 1). Hence, writing this as m(x), with no mention of β, is fine. It is
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effective 
unemployment 
rate
1
.5
.5 10
 _ β
M (x)
m(x)
usual unemployment
rate, x
Fig. 1. This shows the relation between the usual and effective unemployment rate
for a given value of β
obvious that m(x), will be a 45o–line as shown in Figure One. Thus if half
the society has to be half unemployed (i.e. x = 12 ), the lowest value M
β takes
is when every person is half-time unemployed. In that case, for all β ∈ (0, 1),
Mβ(x, ... , x) = 12 .
Here is an interesting question. Let us pick any x ∈ [0, 1] and think of
the worst distribution of this total burden of x unemployment (in the sense
of the distribution that makes effective unemployment the maximum). By
the transfer axiom, we know that this happens when some people are fully
unemployed and the rest are fully employed. Hence, fix β ∈ (0, 1), consider
this worst-distribution for every x and define M
β
(x) as the value of Mβ for a
given unemployment profile, (r1, r2, ... , rn), which is the worst way to share
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the burden of nx. Clearly M
β
(x) ∈ (x, 1), ∀x. It is not hard to see that for
a given β, M
β
(x) will look something like the curve shown in Figure One.
The higher the values of β, the higher the curve will be. And as β goes to 0,
the line will converge to the m(x) curve.
There are two ways of choosing β. One is to elicit this from individual
choice. This involves asking individuals questions like: If you face a choice of
two lotteries, one in which you will be unemployed all year with the probability
1
4 or employed for the full year with probability
3
4 ; and the other in which you
will be employed for a fraction t of the year with certainty and unemployed
for the remainder of the year, what value of t would you choose? This would
be in the spirit of what is done by Ligon and Schechter in [17].
The other way to approach β is as a moral judgement of the policy maker.
In the absence of data on individual risk-aversion, let us explore that moral
approach here. Just to fix our thinking consider the case of x = 12 . We
know that if every person is unemployed 12 of the year then M
β( 12 ) =
1
2 , ∀β.
Now consider the worst distribution of this total burden. Clearly this is one
where n2 persons are fully employed and
n
2 persons are fully unemployed. Let
R = (r1, r2, ..... , rn) signify such a distribution. We know thatMβ(R) ∈ ( 12 , 1)
as β varies from 0 to 1. We need to ask ourselves: what score we would
like to give to Mβ(R)? One simple strategy is to set this half-way in this
interval. That is Mβ(R) = 34 . In other words we are making the judgement
that a society where half the people are fully employed and half are fully
unemployed is equivalent to one where everybody is employed with certainty
16 Basu and Nolen
for one quarter of the time. What would β have to be to yield this mid-way
result?
The answer turns out to be, interestingly, 89 . To see this note:
Mβ (R) =
1
β
−
(
1
β
− 1
) 1
n ·n2 ( 1
β
− 0
) 1
n ·n2
=
1
β
−
(
1
β
− 1
) 1
2
(
1
β
) 1
2
=
1
β
− (1− β)
1
2
β
If Mβ(R) = 34 , it follows that β =
8
9 . Hence, the
8
9 rule. We shall use this in
the empirical section, as one of the salient values. Before moving on we should
point out that in practice β could well vary from one country to another.
Depending on the policies that nations follow to support the unemployed,
the trauma of unemployment can vary from one nation to another. We shall
however ignore this complication here.
3 Simple Data Exercise
To provide an illustrative example of how our measure works we require certain
information. Firstly, a history of how much someone was unemployed over a
certain period of time. For this exercise we will use the weeks or months one
was unemployed over a year. Second, we require a value for the parameter
β. As explained earlier, for the purpose of illustration, we will use the values
β = 12 and β =
8
9 .
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The March Current Population Surveys (hereafter referred to as the CPS)
for the United States have the amount of weeks any member of the workforce
was employed during the previous year. The Labour Force Surveys (hereafter
referred to as LFS) for South Africa have the amount of months that one has
been unemployed, if she was unemployed at the time of the survey, and when
one started a job, if she is currently working at the time of the survey. These
data allow us to illustrate the differences of the effective and the standard
measures of unemployment. In the South African case one will have to make
some assumptions to go from the available data to the measures we wish to
calculate.
3.1 United States
We will begin with the case of the United States. The CPS contains how
many weeks a survey participant had been employed during the previous year.
Therefore, since we have the data for the March CPS from 1976 through 2003,
we are able to calculate the usual yearly unemployment rate and the effec-
tive yearly unemployment rate for the years of 1975 through 2002 (excluding
1993).
To get measures of unemployment as accurate as possible we tried to
exclude students and retired individuals by calculating the unemployment
rates only for people between the ages of 25 and 54. Any persons who listed
themselves as being unemployed for any of the following reasons were dropped
from our data even if they were between the ages of 25 and 54: to take care of
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house or family; ill or disabled; to attend school; retired. Anyone who claimed
to have not worked for the year, but had spent less than four weeks searching
for a job was also not included in our data set. Thus we were left only with
people who were able to participate in the labor market during the full year
and had been actively seeking work.
Table One shows the usual unemployment rate and the effective unem-
ployment rates for β = 12 and β =
8
9 over the years for which we have data.
Figure Two puts this information into graphical form. To begin our discussion
it is useful to focus attention on three sets of years: 1987-1989; 1991-1992; and
1999-2000. These three periods illustrate how even though the usual unem-
ployment rate stayed roughly constant our effective unemployment measures
tell a different story in these periods. The period from 1987 to 1989 has a
continuous decrease in the effective unemployment rate at β = 89 . During
this period the usual unemployment rate, though, rose slightly from 1987 to
1988 and then back to slightly below the 1987 level in 1989. Thus, while
the usual unemployment measure would rank 1987, 1988 and 1989 as being
roughly equivalent, if one takes vulnerability into account – as we have defined
it – then 1989 would be ranked as having an unambiguously better employ-
ment situation than either of the other two years, and 1988 would be ranked
higher than 1987. The effective measure at β = 12 shows the same trend but
there is almost no difference between 1987 and 1988. Therefore during the
years of 1987 to 1989, under President Reagan’s administration, the burden
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Usual Effective Effective
Year Unemployment Unemployment Unemployment
Rate Rate at β = 12 Rate at β =
8
9
2002 0.0529 0.0624 0.0803
2001 0.0457 0.0533 0.0669
2000 0.0382 0.0442 0.0544
1999 0.0382 0.0443 0.0547
1998 0.0490 0.0572 0.0721
1997 0.0431 0.0502 0.0630
1996 0.0530 0.0619 0.0782
1995 0.0585 0.0686 0.0874
1994 0.0612 0.0719 0.0922
1993 – – –
1992 0.0707 0.0834 0.1079
1991 0.0705 0.0822 0.1039
1990 0.0602 0.0697 0.0864
1989 0.0529 0.0613 0.0761
1988 0.0543 0.0633 0.0797
1987 0.0537 0.0632 0.0819
1986 0.0621 0.0734 0.0958
1985 0.0639 0.0756 0.0987
1984 0.0677 0.0807 0.1071
1983 0.0829 0.0994 0.1341
1982 0.0916 0.1092 0.1455
1981 0.0680 0.0800 0.1037
1980 0.0635 0.0744 0.0953
1979 0.0500 0.0579 0.0726
1978 0.0501 0.0583 0.0735
1977 0.0565 0.0663 0.0850
1976 0.0646 0.0763 0.0996
1975 0.0708 0.0836 0.1089
Table 1. Usual and efficient unemployment rates for individuals that were in the
labor force, aged 25 to 54 and available for employment that entire year. Note: the
symbol “ – ” implies the unemployment rate could not be calculated for that period.
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of unemployment became more equitably shared according to the effective
unemployment measure with β = 89 .
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Figure 1.2
The usual and effective yearly unemployment rates in the United States over the 
period of 1975 to 2002.
Fig. 2. The usual and effective yearly une ployment rates in the United States
over the 1975 to 2002
The period of 1991-1992, under President George Herbert Walker Bush’s
administration, our effective unemployment measures again deviate from the
rankings provided by the usual measure of unemployment. Again during this
period we have the usual unemployment rate staying roughly constant, but by
both the effective unemployment measure with β = 89 and with β =
1
2 effective
unemployment measures the burden of unemployment was being shared less
equitably in 1992 than in 1991. In contrast to these two examples, the period
of 1999-2000, during Bill Clinton’s administration, shows that both the usual
unemployment measure and the effective unemployment measures rank the
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years as being roughly equivalent. This shows that there was no significant
change in the equity of how the unemployment burden was being shared.
These examples illustrate how our measure can be used to distinguish
between years that might seem to be roughly equivalent in regards to un-
employment, and shows how the role of vulnerability can cause a re-ranking
of how one judges a country’s unemployment situation over the years. This
illustration uses only information from within one country. The effective
unemployment measures could also be used to compare the unemployment
situation between countries. Indeed, this will be done below.
3.2 South Africa
The South African LFS are twice yearly surveys that are representative of the
Republic of South Africa. The survey collects data on people who are cur-
rently unemployed and those currently employed, but figuring out the yearly
history of individuals is not as easy as with the CPS. Any person who is
currently employed is asked when she began working at that job. Therefore
we have a measure of her duration of current employment. Likewise, anyone
unemployed is asked how long it has been since she last worked, if she had
worked at all, giving us the duration of the current unemployment spell.
In South Africa the labor unions are rather powerful and, because of the
historical situation, firing an individual is rather difficult. Therefore, job
turnover is a rarer phenomenon than in the United States. Thus, the dura-
tion periods are probably an accurate measures of a labor force participant’s
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job status over the past year. With this in mind the usual and effective
unemployment rates were calculated in this ‘moderate’ case. The durations
are by no means guaranteed to be accurate representatives of the employ-
ment history, though, so we have also constructed bounds to the measures of
unemployment.
To understand how these bounds were calculated let us look at a worker
who was employed for six months at the time of the survey. We know that
she has worked at least six months over the past year, and the employment
pattern for the other six months is lost. In the worst case scenario she spent
the previous six months searching for the one job she had at the time of the
survey and was unemployed the rest of the time. This means that her duration
of current employment is the worst history she could have. On the other hand,
since we know she was only working at her current job for six months she could
have found that job after only one month or less of unemployment – we count
her as having had one month of unemployment even if it was less than that,
though. Thus her best unemployment profile would be eleven months working
and one month unemployed.
Likewise a currently unemployed person has a best and worse case scenario.
If a person was unemployed for six months, then, in the best case, she was
working for the six months before that and in the worst case she was working
for only one month before her unemployment began. The usual and effective
unemployment rates were therefore also calculated for both the ‘worst’ and
‘best’ case scenarios.
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When comparing the usual unemployment rate under these three scenarios
to that listed as the official unemployment rate in the LFS the moderate rate
was almost identical in all five periods. 5 Therefore, in our discussion below we
will use the results from the calculations done on the moderate data, though,
using either of the other scenarios does not change our analysis.
South African Unemployment
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Figure 1.3
The usual and effective unemployment rates in South Africa under the moderate senario 
for the months of February 2000, 2001 and 2002 and September 2000 and 2001.
Fig. 3. The usual and effective unemployment rates in South Africa under the
moderate scenario for the months of February 2000, 2001, 2002 and September 2000
and 2001
The usual and effective unemployment rates for the ‘moderate’ case are
depicted graphically in figure three. The effective unemployment seems to be
simply a horizontal increase of the usual unemployment. This may be because
of the coarseness of the LFS data with respect to the CPS data or it may be
5 The official unemployment rates according to the LFS are 26.2, 25.4, 26, 29.2 and
29 percent while the usual unemployment rate calculated using the ‘moderate’
estimates of ri are 23, 23, 23.2, 28.5 and 31.7 for February 2000, September 2000,
February 2001, September 2001 and February 2002 respectively.
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because of a lack of change in the equity of unemployment. Comparing this
graph to that of the United States, though, one can see that the jump from
the usual measure of unemployment to the effective measures is much higher
in both the β = 12 and β =
8
9 case for South Africa than for the United States.
The effective unemployment rate at β = 12 , was, on average, 1.17 times the
usual unemployment rate in the US and never above 1.199 the usual rate. In
South Africa, though, the effective unemployment rate at β = 12 is on average
1.25 times the usual unemployment rate and never below 1.22 times the usual
rate. Likewise at β = 89 the effective unemployment rate is on average 1.50
times and 1.83 times the usual unemployment rate in the US and South Africa
respectively.
One may ask: What does this proportional difference show? Since our
effective unemployment measure adjusts for the inequity of unemployment in
a society then the higher jump from the usual to effective rate in the case
of South Africa suggests that the burden of unemployment is shared less
equitably in South Africa than in the United States. Given South Africa’s
history this is not a hard story to believe. To make this claim in a more
rigorous manner, and not just to provide an illustration, one would have to test
the confidence intervals of the proportions mentioned above. Given the size of
the samples in both the LFS and the CPS the discussion above will probably
still be valid. Furthermore, one could ask what is causing the difference in
these proportions of unemployment. For example it may be that we are
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only picking up frictional unemployment in the United States, but structural
unemployment in South Africa.
4 Full Characterization of the Effective Measure
After seeing the usefulness of this measure and its applicability it is worth
returning to the theoretical discussion and addressing a natural question. We
have seen that our measure of unemployment satisfies several attractive ax-
ioms, but is there a set of axioms that exactly characterize our measure or,
more precisely, the class of measures we proposed and is stated in (2)? This
is what we set out to answer in this section.
A property that we have already discussed but needs to be stated formally
is codified in the next axiom.
Axiom C (Coincidence): A MOU, M , satisfies coincidence if ∀R =
(r1, r2, ..., rn) ∈ ∆, such that r1 = r2 = ... = rn ≡ r, M (R) = r.
This axiom says that if in some society everybody is unemployed to the
same extent as everybody else, then the society’s unemployment rate should
be equal to the individual’s unemployment rate. This is a normalization axiom
which says that if the distribution of unemployment is perfectly egalitarian
then our measure coincides with the standard unemployment rate.
Another axiom that we will use and seems eminently reasonable is the
following.
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Axiom A (Anonymity): The MOU, M , satisfies anonymity if ∀R =
(r1, r2, ..., rn) ∈ ∆ and ∀ permutations σ : {1, ..., n} → {1, ..., n}, M (R) =
M
(
rσ(1), rσ(2), ..., rσ(n)
)
.
And finally, a much stronger axiom.
Axiom R (Representation): For every individual i, ∃ a utility function
ui : [0, 1]→ R++,and ∀n ∈ Z++, ∃ an aggregation mapping
F : Rn++ → R, such that, ∀R = (r1, r2, ..., rn) where ri ∈ [0, 1],
M(R) = F (u1 (r1) , u2 (r2) , ..., un (rn)) and
(i) ∀i, ui is affine and decreasing,
(ii) F satisfies anonymity. That is ∀u = (u1, u2, ..., un) ∈ Rn++ and
∀ permutations σ : {1, ..., n} → {1, ..., n} , then F (u1, u2, ..., un) =
F (uσ(1), uσ(2), ..., uσ(n)) . And
(iii) F satisfies scale independence. That is
F (u1, u2, ..., un) ≥ F (u′1, u′2, ..., u′n) and (b1, b2, ..., bn) ∈ Rn++ implies that
F (b1u1, b2u2, ..., bnun) ≥ F (b1u′1, b2u′2, ..., bnu′n).
If an MOU satisfies axiom R, we shall call each ui function and the F
function referred to in the axiom as person i’s utility function and the society’s
aggregation function, respectively.
What Axiom R(iii) says is that a change in the unit for measuring one
person’s utility must be of no consequence in our social evaluation of the
economy. This not a normative axiom but an informational one, in the spirit of
standard “invariance axioms”[20] used in social choice and bargaining theory
and meant to capture the degree of measurability of an individual’s utility.
Theorem 1: An MOU, M, satisfies axioms A, C, O and R if and only if
it belongs to the class described in (2). That is, ∀R ∈ (r1, r2, ..., rn) ∈ ∆,
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M (r) =
1
β
−
[
n∏
i=1
(
1
β
− ri
)] 1n
where β ∈ (0 , 1 )
Proof. (⇒) We have already seen that the MOU described in (2) satisfies
axioms C and O. Axiom A is obvious. To see that it satisfies axiom R,
consider ui = 1β − ri, for all i, and define the welfare mapping F as follows:
F =
1
β
−
[
n∏
i=1
ui
] 1
n
(3)
It is easy to see that (3) satisfies axiom R.
(⇐) Next assume that M is an MOU that satisfies axioms A, C, O, and
R. By axiom R we know that ∃ a welfare mapping F such that, ∀R =
(r1, r2, ..., rn) ∈ ∆, M(R) = F (u1 (r1) , u2 (r2) , ..., un (rn)). Now the proof
will continue in a series of steps.
• Step 1: It will first be shown that F is a transformation of the product
of the arguments. In other words, ∀ u = (u1, u2, ..., un) ∈ Rn++, F (u) =
φ
(
n∏
i=1
ui
)
. Consider a utility vector u = (u1, u2, ..., un) ∈ Rn++. Then we
know that
(
u
1
n
1 , u
1
n
2 , ..., u
1
n
n
)
∈ Rn++.
Note F
(
u
1
n
1 , u
1
n
2 , ..., u
1
n
n
)
= F
(
u
1
n
2 , u
1
n
3 , ..., u
1
n
n , u
1
n
1
)
by axiom R(ii).
F
(
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1
n
1 u
1
n
1 , u
1
n
2 u
1
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2 , ..., u
1
n
n u
1
n
n
)
= F
(
u
1
n
1 u
1
n
2 , u
1
n
2 u
1
n
3 , ..., u
1
n
n−1u
1
n
n , u
1
n
n u
1
n
1
)
by axiom R(iii).
F
(
u
2
n
1 , u
2
n
2 , ..., u
2
n
n
)
= F
(
(u1u2)
1
n , (u2u3)
1
n , ..., (un−1un)
1
n , (unu1)
1
n
)
F
(
u
2
n
1 , u
2
n
2 , ..., u
2
n
n
)
= F
(
(u2u3)
1
n , (u3u4)
1
n , ..., (unu1)
1
n , (u1u2)
1
n
)
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by axiom R(ii).
F
(
u
3
n
1 , u
3
n
2 , ..., u
3
n
n
)
= F
(
(u1u2u3)
1
n , (u2u3u4)
1
n , ..., (unu1u2)
1
n
)
by axiom R(iii).
Continuing in this manner we get
F
(
u
n
n
1 , u
n
n
2 , ..., u
n
n
n
)
= F
(
(
∏n
i=1 ui)
1
n , (
∏n
i=1 ui)
1
n , ..., (
∏n
i=1 ui)
1
n
)
It follows that if u, v ∈ Rn++ such that
∏n
i=1 ui =
∏n
i=1 vi, then F (u) =
F (v). Hence, ∃ a function φ, such that ∀ u ∈ Rn++, F (u) = φ (
∏n
i=1 ui).
• Step 2: Now it will be shown that F is a negative monotone transfor-
mation of the product of the arguments. That is ∃ φ : R → [0, 1] such
that x, y ∈ R, x > y implies φ(x) < φ(y). Let R, R′ ∈ ∆ be such
that R = (r1, r2, ..., rn) and R′ = (r′1, r
′
2, ..., r
′
n), r
′
1 > r1 and r
′
i = ri,
∀i ∈ {2, 3, ..., n}. Then by axiom O, M(R′) > M (R). Now, by axiom
R, in particular that ui is a decreasing function for all i, we know that
u1 (r1)
∏n
i=2 ui (ri) > u1 (r
′
1)
∏n
i=2 ui (ri). Furthermore, again by axiom
R, we know:
M (R) = F (u1 (r1) , u2 (r2) , ..., un (rn)) = φ
(
u1 (r1)
n∏
i=2
ui (ri)
)
M (R′) = φ
(
u1 (r′1)
n∏
i=2
ui (ri)
)
Since M(R′) > M (R), it follows that φ is a decreasing function.
• Thus with these two steps we know that there exists a decreasing function
φ such that ∀R = (r1, r2, ..., rn)
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M(R) = φ
(
n∏
i=1
ui (ri)
)
(4)
• Step 3: Now it will be shown that there is no loss of generality by re-
quiring that every person’s utility function is identical. Consider R =
(r∗, r2, ..., rn) ∈ ∆. By axiom A, M (r∗, r2, ..., rn) = M (r2, r∗, ..., rn).
Hence (4) implies that
M (r∗, r2, ..., rn) = M (r2, r∗, ..., rn)
φ
(
u1 (r∗)u2 (r2)
n∏
i=3
ui (ri)
)
= φ
(
u1 (r2)u2 (r∗)
n∏
i=3
ui (ri)
)
and, since φ has been shown to be a decreasing function we have:
u1 (r∗)u2 (r2)
n∏
i=3
ui (ri) = u1 (r2)u2 (r∗)
n∏
i=3
ui (ri)
which implies u1 (r∗)u2 (r2) = u1 (r2)u2 (r∗)
u2 (r2) =
u1 (r2)u2 (r∗)
u1 (r∗)
Likewise, using the same argument as above we have that uj (rj) =
u1(rj)
uj(r
∗)
u1(r∗)
, ∀j = 1, ..., n. Therefore, ∀(r1, r2, ..., rn) ∈ ∆,
∏n
i=1 ui (ri) =
θ
∏n
i=1 ui (r
∗) where θ ≡
∏n
i=1 ui(r
∗)
u1(r∗)n
> 0. It follows that if there is a de-
creasing function φ satisfying (4), there must exist a decreasing function
Ψ , such that ∀R = (r1, r2, ..., rn) ∈ ∆, M(R) = Ψ (
∏n
i=1 u1 (ri))
For simplicity we will write u(ri) for u1(ri) so we have
M(R) = Ψ
(
n∏
i=1
u (ri)
)
(5)
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• Step 4: We will now complete the proof. By axiom C, we know that
∀r ∈ [0, 1], r = Ψ (u (ri)n). If we write x ≡ u (ri)n, then Ψ (x) = u−1
(
x
1
n
)
.
By axiom R(i), we can write u (r) = A − Br, where B > 0. Hence,
Ψ (x) = AB − x
1
n
B . Therefore, by using (5) we have
M(r1, r2, ..., rn) =
A
B
− 1
B
[
n∏
i=1
(A−Bri)
] 1
n
=
A
B
−
[
n∏
i=1
(
A
B
− ri
)] 1n
By writing β for BA , we have
M(r1, r2, ..., rn) =
1
β
−
[
n∏
i=1
(
1
β
− ri
)] 1n
Since u : [0, 1]→ R++, then u (1) = [A−B · 1] > 0 which implies A > B.
Therefore 1 > β. Since, in addition B > 0 (by axiom R(i)), then β > 0.
What we have left therefore is precisely the class of MOUs described in
(2). uunionsq
One advantage of a full axiomatization of the kind just undertaken is that
it helps us evaluate the measure by factorizing it to its constituents. In this
case the strong assumption is clearly axiom R. This requires individual utility
to be cardinal but does not impose interpersonal comparability. This kind
of an axiom is used to derive the Nash bargaining solution and is also widely
used by Sen in social choice theory ( see [20, 22] for instance). What may
appear more contentious is the requirement that ui be affine.
Some may treat this as reason to look for a different measure of unem-
ployment, but there are two points worth keeping in mind. First, there are
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alternate ways of axiomatizing the same measure. So there may be other
ways of visualizing our measure that do not require one to use an affine utility
function as an input.
Secondly, we must not think of the utility function of each person, ui,
as the person’s own evaluation of her utility. Instead it should be viewed
as society’s evaluation of a person’s employment status, which may well be
different from the person’s own utility evaluation (this is elaborated upon
further in the next section). Once we take this approach and note that there
are two steps to getting to a final measure (i) the assessment of each person’s
utility, ui, and (ii) aggregation of these using a function, F , it becomes evident
that the concavity of F acts as a substitute for diminishing marginal utility
of the individual and that is the route we are taking here.
Moreover, our approach has some natural interpretational advantages.
Consider person i’s utility function: ui = A − Bri. Let ∆ui be the change
in this person’s utility if her status changed from fully unemployed (ri = 1)
to fully employed (ri = 0). Clearly ∆ui = B. Now let u˜i be this person’s
reservation utility, meaning the utility this person gets if she is without any
work (ri = 1). Clearly u˜i = A − B, i.e. a person without work has a utility
of A − B. Hence, the ratio of the utility from other things (i.e. other than
work) to utility from being able to work is given by u˜i∆ui =
A
B − 1.
Hence, an increase in A denotes how the other things in life are more im-
portant than work. An increase in A is thus associated with moving to a
society where there is reasonable social welfare and other sources of income
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(for instance, through equity ownership) or where work is not as much a source
of a person’s social recognition. 6 Now note that since β = BA , an increase in
A is equivalent to β going towards zero. This, as we have already seen pushes
us towards the additive, or utilitarian, case where egalitarianism in unemploy-
ment matters less in our MOU given by (2). Likewise as A becomes smaller,
β becomes larger. In the limit employment achieves enormous importance
and our MOU converges towards a multiplicative evaluation.
5 Discussion
Given the full characterization of the effective measure of unemployment and,
before going on to discuss vulnerability in the context of poverty, it is useful
to draw out some of the distinctions between the existing literature and our
paper. First note that the bulk of the existing writing – the theoretical [5, 17]
and the empirical [16] – mainly focuses on isolating individual vulnerability.
It asks questions like: “Who is vulnerable to becoming unemployed or poor?”
and “How do we estimate the number of vulnerable individuals?”
Our interest, on the other hand, is to assume that we know how many
vulnerable or potentially unemployed persons (or people vulnerable to poverty,
though, we have yet to address this) there are in society and then to develop
an aggregate measure of effective unemployment, that is, to find a single
number that captures the total unemployment – actual and potential. Among
6 The ‘social’ cost of unemployment does not always get its due. But it is arguable
that once our basic economic needs are satisfied, loss of face becomes a dominant
cost of unemployment (see [23] for instance).
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the few papers that share our concern with the aggregate are [25, 26, 18, 7].
7 Borooah in [7] develops a measure, drawing on the work of Atkinson [3, 4]
in which aggregate, effective unemployment is derived from an aggregation of
separable individual utilities.
Our measure charts out a different course based on a rejection of this
separability. Take a look at our proposed MOU again. Recall, Mβ (R) =
1
β −
n∏
i=1
(
1
β − ri
) 1
n
and let us examine society’s view of one person’s unem-
ployment load, or pain – as referred to by Borooah. Using r1 as an example
we can see that ∂M
β(R)
∂r1
= 1
n( 1β−r1)
[
1
β −Mβ (R)
]
depends on the total effec-
tive unemployment as measured by Mβ (R). Hence, if total unemployment
is higher, then∂M
β(R)
∂r1
is lower. Therefore “the level of pain” that society
associates with person i’s unemployment depends on the level of effective
unemployment in society. This essential relativity is not there in Borooah’s
measure.
Further, this paper takes the view that concepts like poverty, unemploy-
ment and even inequality cannot be reduced to pure welfarism. These are
concepts that cannot be located entirely in the welfares of individuals and
their aggregation. The same distinction that Sen (as in [21]) drew between
ethical and descriptive features of inequality arise here in the context of un-
employment and poverty.
7 Interestingly, [26] is among the few papers that, like ours, uses an axiomatic
approach, though the measure that he develops is different from ours.
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We take the view that a greater amount of aggregate unemployment or
aggregate poverty must not be equated with diminished aggregate social
welfare. 8
This leads to an important difference between our approach and that of
much of the literature on vulnerability that uses the concept of ‘certainty-
equivalence’ to evaluate vulnerability (see, for example, [17], 2003). Since the
comment that follows applies equally to unemployment and poverty, we use
these terms inter-changeably here, which also makes it a useful preamble to
the next section which is purely on poverty measurement.
Suppose a person’s poverty status can change in each month and on aver-
age he will be poor six months in a year (i.e. in each month the probability
of being poor is 12 ), and in the other six months he will be 100 dollars above
poverty. Should he be counted as poor or not? According to the certainty-
equivalence approach, we simply have to ask this person if he would prefer to
change his position with that of another person who will be never poor for
the 12 months but will be exactly on the poverty line at all times. If he says
no, then this vulnerable person is effectively non-poor.
8 Some economists would go even further and argue that a small amount of un-
employment may reflect flexibility in the labor market and so be good for the
economy overall. This is not to deny that there may be a mathematical isomor-
phism between the welfarist approach and our approach. This is evident from
Theorem 1 if we interpret ui’s as each person’s own evaluation of her utility and
think of F as a welfare function. But such interpretations are not necessary and
indeed we would resist them here.
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This sounds like a very reasonable exercise if our interest is in welfare.
But it is clear that the enormous literature on poverty measurement and
unemployment measurement rejects such welfarism.
To understand this consider a society, x, with 12 persons, of whom six are
poor (or unemployed) and six are each 100 dollars above the poverty line.
Now transport all these 12 persons to a society, y, where they are exactly on
the poverty line. Give each of them the choice of being born into society x
without saying which position she will have. Let us say the probability that
she will be poor (or unemployed) is 12 and the probability that she will be
non-poor with income 100 dollars above the poverty line is also 12 .
It is entirely possible that all 12 persons prefer society x to society y.
Hence, in an ex ante sense x Pareto dominates y. Since there in no poverty
(or unemployment) in y and everybody prefers x to y, if we were equating
poverty (and unemployment) totally with welfare, we would be forced to say
there is no poverty (and no unemployment) in x. But that would be absurd
and indeed with six poor people in this society at all times poor, no one would
say that x has no poverty.
Hence, in developing an aggregate measure of unemployment and poverty
(treating these as descriptions of society) we may be justified in rejecting the
welfarism inherent in the certainty-equivalence approach.
With this justification of the conceptual approach adopted in this paper,
we can now proceed to discuss how the above method can be extended to
measuring effective poverty.
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6 Poverty
It should now be possible to extend our measure from the domain of unem-
ployment to the domain of poverty. It we treat ‘being poor’ as a uniquely
well-defined state, as is implicitly assumed in using the ‘headcount rate’ mea-
sure of poverty, then it is very easy to adopt our measure to this context. With
this augmentation of vulnerability to our concept of poverty we again argue
that vulnerability is again not necessarily a ‘bad.’ If the level of poverty, as
measured by the headcount ratio, were to stay the same, then having people
at risk of becoming poor means there exist people who are currently poor and
are at risk of becoming non-poor. Therefore, under the headcount ratio, our
measure would again provide some useful insights.
To begin, let poverty be measured using the headcount ratio, then define
pi as the proportion of a year that a person spends below the poverty line.
Therefore if pi = 1 then a person is poor for an entire year and if pi = 0 the per-
son is above the poverty line for an entire year. Now we have (p1, p2, ....., pn)
defined as a poverty profile of a society where, for all i, pi ∈ [0, 1]. Let
∆ be the collection of all poverty profiles. That is, ∆ = {(p1, p2, ...., pn) |
n ∈ Z++ & pi ∈ [0, 1] , ∀i} where Z++ is the set of strictly positive integers.
Then letting n be the number of people in a country we are able to define the
‘usual headcount ratio of poverty’ as follows:
H ≡ p1 + p2 + ..... + pn
n
(6)
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If we define a measure of poverty (MOP) as a function P : ∆ → R+,
then H is a MOP. Adapting our measure of unemployment to the present
context we propose the following MOP
P β (p1, .... , pn) ≡ 1
β
−
n∏
i=1
(
1
β
− pi) 1n (7)
where β ∈ (0, 1)
Here β would be our parameter of poverty aversion. Our MOP will satisfy
all of the properties that are discussed above. This measure of poverty is
bounded on one side by the ‘usual’ headcount ratio and on the side by a
Rawlsian-type measure of poverty.
Ever since the celebrated work of Sen [21], poverty is however no longer
treated as a binary concept. It is recognized that the depth of poverty a
person suffers can vary and good measures of poverty ought to reflect this.
One of the most widely used class of poverty measures is the Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke (FGT) class of measures which make critical use of this. If we
recognize that the depth of poverty can vary and people may be vulnerable to
poverty of different depths, how can all this be combined into a single measure
of effective poverty? There must be many ways of doing this but we shall
outline a simple approach here which is based on treating each person at each
point of time as a seperate entity. Once we use this idea of a ‘timed individual,’
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it is straightforward extending our measure of effective unemployment to this
domain of poverty as well.
Imagine there is a society of n individuals, each of whom we observe over
m time periods. Thus we have a total of n ·m observations. Now, rather than
averaging the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (hereafter referred to as FGT) measure
of poverty over time, consider the following. Take each individual i and her m
observations. Let qi be the number of periods that she was below the poverty
line. Then calculate her FGT measure of poverty pi = 1m
∑qi
j=1(
gij
z )
α, where
z is the poverty line, yit is person i’s income at time t, gij = z − yij is person
i’s income gap at time j and α is the poverty aversion parameter.
One property of the FGT measure of poverty is that it is always between
zero and one. Therefore we now have a value pi ∈ [0, 1] that takes account
not only of whether person i is below the poverty line, but the depth of her
poverty and we can now substitute this pi into our MOP, defined by (7),
above.
7 Conclusion
We have offered an alternative way to look at vulnerability to what is currently
being discussed in the literature and by policy makers. That is, vulnerability,
when viewed as a part of an aggregate measure, need not always be treated
as a ‘bad.’ Given this perspective we have provided a way of measuring
‘effective’ unemployment. This measure is bounded on one side by the additive
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or utilitarian measure and on the other side by a multiplicative measure.
Furthermore, our measure satisfies axioms that most people would agree are
what one would want from a measure motivated by equity concerns. We have
fully characterized our measure and shown how the measure can be applied
to data in both the US and in South Africa and what insights can be gained
by comparing the usual and effective measures of unemployment.
This paper then serves two purposes. First, it suggests that the current
debate on vulnerability needs to examine not only the effect of vulnerability
on people currently employed, but also the hope that vulnerability provides
to people who are currently unemployed. Secondly, this paper provides a way
of taking account of these concerns in a single measure of unemployment and
shows how the measure can actually be put to use.
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